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Bab al-Magharibah
Joha's Nail in the
Haram al-Sharif
Nazmi al-Jubeh
Even though Israel occupied the land of Arab
Jerusalem in 1967, it was still not in full
control of key aspects of the city. Many
administrative offices of the eastern half of
the city remained under Palestinian control,
including the Islamic Awqaf, or religious
endowment, Jerusalem's churches, and some
municipal services.
Slowly, Israel has applied pressure on these
various offices in hopes of gaining rock-solid
physical sovereignty. Certainly one of the
lightening rods in this struggle for control has
been the Haram al-Sharif, or al-Aqsa Mosque
compound. The Muslim holy site has
remained a challenge to full Israeli control
nagging at the agendas of successive Israeli
governments, all of which have attempted to
break the Palestinian grip on the area. One
might say they have entered through the front
gate, using the mosque's Bab al-Magharibah
as an entry point for increased Israeli control
over the various duties of maintaining the
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Haram al-Sharif and monitoring its religious
access.
Bab al-Magharibah is located in the southern
section of al-Haram al-Sharif's western wall,1
and was used by the residents of the
Magharibah Quarter, which was demolished
by Israeli bulldozers in June 1967.2 It also
connects the Aqsa Mosque compound with
Jerusalem's southern neighbourhoods,
particularly Silwan.
It is believed that the current gate was built
during the Ayyubid period and renovated and
connected to the western section of the Aqsa
Mosque compound during Mamluke rule.
The gate was constructed around the time that
the Ayyubids endowed the quarter to North
Africans and Moors of Andalusia, Malikites,
who were living side by side in Jerusalem.
The Magharibah, as these communities were
called in Arabic, lived in this area until they
were dispersed with the quarter's demolition.3
The Tendentious Western Wall
Little historical evidence of Jewish
sanctification of the Haram al-Sharif's
western wall has been found prior to the
sixteenth century. Earlier accounts tell of
Jews performing religious rituals on the
Mount of Olives, facing Jerusalem.4 It
appears that Jewish leaders began to take
interest in worshiping at the Western Wall
during the Ottoman period, which was
characterized by a measure of tolerance
towards the Jews.5
At that time, Jews were permitted to perform
their religious rituals in a small courtyard, no
more than five meters wide and 28 meters
long.6 This section of the wall was referred to
by its Arabic name, al-Buraq Wall, in
reference to the wall's significance in the
Prophet Muhammad's midnight journey to
the seven heavens. Muslims believe that the
Prophet Muhammad tied al-Buraq, the
legendary flying horse, to this wall before
entering the sanctuary of the Aqsa Mosque to
pray upon the prophets the night of his
ascension to heaven. In the West, the space is
called the "Wailing Wall" to give the
connotation of mourning and separation,
while more recently Jews and now Israelis
call the area the "Western Wall," a new term
embodying the ethos of "liberation".7
Jews continued to use this section of the wall,
without ownership or the possibility of
placing fixed property, until 1925 with no
problems of note.8 Ownership remained
Muslim without debate, and Jews were
permitted by the Muslims to practice their
religious rites at the wall. Muslims
considered the wall an inseparable part of the
Haram al-Sharif, and placed great
significance in its role in the Prophet
Muhammad's nighttime ascension to heaven.
But in September of 1925, Jewish
worshippers attempted to transform this space
into a temple. They brought tables, chairs and
books to the site on the grounds that the wall
was part of the remains of the Second
Temple, which was destroyed by the Roman
Emperor Titus in 70 AD. The ensuing dispute
with Muslims would have turned into a full-
scale battle, compounded as it was by the
rising number of Jews in Jerusalem and
Zionist aspirations, if the British Mandate
authorities had not intervened to end the
conflict, upholding laws of "status quo"
created by the Ottomans in the mid-
nineteenth century.9 In theory, these laws
remain in place today, governing disputes that
arise over religious sites, particularly the holy
spaces shared by various Christian sects.
Three years later, in 1928, the dispute was
revisited when Jewish groups requested
abrogation of the British ruling for the status
quo. This request was advanced when Jewish
worshippers brought a partition screen to the
site on Yom Kippur of 9 August, 1928 (the
anniversary of the Second Temple's
destruction). The site's British guard once
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again removed the screen on the grounds that
it challenged the British decision, and could
dangerously tip the status quo.
That November, the first Islamic conference
was convened in Jerusalem. In addition to
other issues on the conference work schedule,
representatives from all corners of the Islamic
world reiterated Muslim opposition to any
changes at the Buraq Wall. Notwithstanding,
several minor incidents followed that brought
the issue of the wall to the forefront, while
equally expressing resistance to Zionism,
Jewish immigration and the British policy of
transferring Palestinian property to Jews. In
August of 1929, these events culminated in
the uprising known in Palestinian political
lore as the "Buraq Revolt," which left some
250 Arab and Jewish dead. The Sir Walter
Shaw Commission was subsequently formed
to investigate the factors leading to the
rebellion.10
Still, the official relationship between area
Muslims and Jews, as determined by the
"status quo," did not change. British Mandate
officials affirmed repeatedly that all
components of the Haram al-Sharif's western
wall remained Islamic property alone, due to
its sanctity to Muslims. The British Mandate
administration also affirmed that Jews had the
right to hold religious rituals at the site as
prescribed by custom.
The problem was eventually buried by the
events of the 1948 War, despite its mention in
Israeli-Jordanian truce talks and Jordan's
subsequent decision to grant Jews right of
access to the Buraq Wall. Jordan never
implemented its decision, because of the
ongoing state of war between it and the new
Jewish state. The following years were
marked by Palestinian attempts to overcome
the losses they had suffered in the
dispossession of their homeland. It was not
until 1967 that the Haram al-Sharif was once
again placed at the epicentre of the religious
nationalist tug of war.
The Six-Day War of 1967
After its overwhelming victory in the 1967
War, Israel wasted no time in changing all of
the agreements governing the "status quo".
Israel appointed itself, in accordance with
Israeli law and despite international
opposition, the "sovereign state," and applied
Israeli law (albeit without announcing
"sovereignty" or using the term "annexation")
to Arab Jerusalem, which it had occupied
during the course of the war.
On 27 June, 1967, the Israeli Knesset passed
three laws that affected the status of
Jerusalem and its religious sites. Palestinians
and most international parties considered
these laws glaring violations of international
law and norms, and a unilateral abrogation of
the status quo. Concurrently, Israel used force
to accomplish facts on the ground within
Arab Jerusalem, and despite their lack of
legitimacy, this new reality has formed the
basis for current peace negotiations and
affected all of their results. The laws passed
in 1967 enforced the following:
 Application of Israeli law, including the
Law of Antiquities, on Jerusalem "in its
entirety."
 Annexation of unified Jerusalem, from
Qalandiya in the north to Sur Baher in the
south, to the Jerusalem municipality and
dissolution of the municipality's Arab
Council and placement of expanded
"unified" Jerusalem under the Israeli
municipality.
 Issuance of the Protection of Holy Sites
Law, which provides freedom of worship
and access to sacred places for all
religions. The Israeli Minister of Religions
was entrusted with enforcing this law.
These laws gave Israel de facto sovereignty
over the city, despite the fact that they made
no actual reference to the issue of sovereignty
per se.11 Israel's first physical changes to the
status quo were the destruction of the
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Magharibah Quarter and the creation of a vast
plaza in front of the Buraq Wall for Jewish
Israeli religious and civil use (military events
are held in this plaza that aim to strengthen
the "nationalist" relationship between Israelis
and the wall, and this is the site where Israeli
soldiers take the pledge of allegiance to their
state upon completing military training). The
Buraq Wall was seized after its area was
expanded and registered in 1984 with the
Israeli property department as property of the
Jewish state.12
Bab al-Magharibah First
In August of 1967, shortly after Israel had
occupied Arab Jerusalem and before the al-
Magharibah Quarter had been completely
demolished and levelled, the Israeli defence
minister at that time, Moshe Dayan, ordered
the director of the Jerusalem Awqaf, the late
Hassan Tahbub, to hand over to Israeli forces
the keys to Bab al-Magharibah (the gate to
the Haram al-Sharif). Upon consultation with
members of the newly formed Islamic
Council, Hassan Tahbub rejected the demand
on the grounds that the gates to the Haram al-
Sharif are an inseparable component of the
compound. He argued that the Haram al-
Sharif is solely and irrefutably Islamic
property - guaranteed and supported as such
by international law and the site's long
Islamic history.
On 31 August, Israeli troops were then sent to
the Islamic Awqaf headquarters at the al-
Manjakiyya school near Bab al-Majlis to
seize the keys to the gate under threat of
force. The gate's keys, and hence the gate
itself, thereby came under control of the
Israeli forces, which stationed Israeli military
police at the site. Some Israelis believed that
Israeli military control of Bab al-Magharibah
dashed extremist Jews' dreams of controlling
the entire al-Aqsa Mosque compound.13 The
Islamic Awqaf, however, viewed the takeover
as a break in complete Islamic control of the
site and the beginning of increasing Israeli
interference in the compound's
administration, freedom of worship, and
Muslim access to their holy sites.
The tug of war between the Islamic Awqaf
and the Israeli government over Bab al-
Magharibah began to manifest itself through
a variety of incidents, escalating with the
burning of the Aqsa Mosque on 21 August,
1969. Immediately afterwards, Israel closed
the gate for fear that Jews would rush the
compound upon seeing smoke rise from the
mosque building. Likewise, the Awqaf closed
all of the compound's gates to non-Muslim
visitors, and demanded that Bab al-
Magharibah be returned to Islamic control
before the compound was reopened to non-
Muslim guests.
The Islamic Awqaf linked the fire to Israeli
control of Bab al-Magharibah, on the grounds
that the arsonist had smuggled in the
materials used to set alight the mosque's
wooden ceiling and dome via that particular
gate, within eyesight and earshot of the Israeli
forces. On that basis, the Islamic Awqaf
insisted that control of the gate be returned to
its offices. Israel, on the other hand, had its
own fears that the Islamic Awqaf had
solidified control over the entire al-Aqsa
Mosque compound by charging that the
burning of the mosque had inflamed the
emotions of Muslims around the world.
The incident gained such importance that the
Israeli government held a cabinet meeting on
19 October, 1969 to discuss the issue at
length. The cabinet decided to re-open the
compound to visitors in order to "return
normalcy to the area." Indeed, the following
day, Israeli forces opened Bab al-Magharibah
to non-Muslim visitors in a direct challenge
to the Islamic Awqaf. Doing so underscored
that control over the Haram al-Sharif was not
entirely Muslim, or at least not recognized by
Israel as being completely under Awqaf
control.
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One month later, the Awqaf attempted to
reassert authority by opening the remaining
compound gates. At the same time, it kept the
mosques themselves closed to visitors,
allowing them to enter only the compound's
courtyards. This lasted until 24 October,
1972, when the Awqaf decided to reopen both
of the mosques (the Dome of the Rock and
the Aqsa Mosque) to non-Muslim guests.
The Islamic Awqaf did not, however, stop its
loud declarations, made both locally and
internationally, that it feared and rejected out
of hand any Israeli control over Bab al-
Magharibah. To give one example of these
protestations, on 18 February, 1976, the
Islamic Council issued a statement addressing
the gate's condition: "…it suffices to say that
the Islamic Awqaf, which is entrusted with
protecting the Aqsa Mosque, does not possess
effective supervision over its entrances and
gates, for the (Israeli) authorities continue to
this day to hold the keys to one of the main
gates, Bab al-Magharibah."14
Nor did the Islamic Awqaf hesitate to follow
up. On 9 August, 1977, it sent a letter to the
United States secretary of state protesting the
confiscation of Bab al-Magharibah 's keys
and other Israeli measures.15 The Islamic
Awqaf viewed even the smallest attempt to
alter circumstances to be a serious
transgression of its control over the
compound.  It issued a statement on 29
December, 1978 protesting the fact that Israel
had painted and renovated the wooden door
to Bab al-Magharibah, despite that the door
remained the property of the Islamic Awqaf.16
This incident was considered a further Israeli
attempt to weaken the Islamic Awqaf's
control over the Haram al-Sharif.
On 28 April, 1982, an Israeli soldier attacked
the Dome of the Rock, firing a machinegun
both inside the mosque and around it. The
Islamic Awqaf subsequently closed the
compound once again to non-Muslim
visitors, on the basis that the soldier had
entered the compound with his weapons via
Bab al-Magharibah. The Awqaf issued a
statement that read, "The practice of opening
and closing the gates of the al-Haram al-
Sharif is solely the right of Muslims."17
Israel subsequently used that same incident to
secure Israeli control over the remaining
gates by positioning Israeli border guards
(under supervision of the Israeli police) at all
of the compound's entrances. Those guards
controlled movement to and from the Haram
al-Sharif. The Israeli police also controlled
which of the compound's gates were open or
shut, under the pretext of making security
arrangements to protect the compound from
extremist Jews.
This situation had serious ramifications for
Muslim freedom of access to holy sites.
Muslims waited in long lines before the
compound's gates at prayer times, particularly
on Fridays, in order to be searched by the
Israeli police. The concept of protecting the
compound's gates gradually expanded to
allow Israeli border guards and police into the
compound's courtyards, where they
conducted armed patrols.
Dramatic Transformations
Following the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo
Accords of 1993, Israeli attempts to
consolidate its control over Jerusalem only
increased. During this period, Israel
attempted to create facts on the ground and
pre-empt the outcome of planned final
negotiations (including negotiations over the
city's future), by reinforcing its control over
land and by superimposing symbols of Israeli
sovereignty on the holy city.18
Despite top level Israeli and American
representation at negotiations at both Camp
David II and Sharm al-Sheikh,19 it has been
argued that the talks over Jerusalem's future
never reached complete seriousness. At those
negotiations, it was proposed that the city be
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divided into two areas of sovereignty, one
Israeli and the other Palestinian, using as a
guideline the Israeli and Palestinian presence
in the city at the time of the talks. The reality
was, however, that Israel's perpetual
expansion and rather public policy of
Judaization has turned Jerusalem into a city
difficult to separate.20
Just before those talks commenced, in 1997,
the Islamic Awqaf began the rather daring
process of renovating "Suleiman's Stables"21
(now known as the Marwani Mosque) in the
southeast corner of the Haram al-Sharif. This
was accomplished by excavating the ground
in that section of the compound's courtyard,
an area of 4,500 square meters below the
level of the Aqsa Mosque. Doing so created a
third mosque with an area larger than that of
al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock combined,
thereby providing a vast new space for
additional worshippers. The project also
stymied plans promoted by some Israelis to
turn part of the Haram, that under renovation,
into a Jewish temple. Moreover, the mosque
connects directly to the outside of Jerusalem's
Old City via several sealed gates that are easy
to open and link to the Buraq courtyard.
This endeavour intensified the struggle for
sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif. Since
the work began, the Islamic Awqaf has
consistently refused to allow any interference
from the Israeli Antiquities Authority in the
renovation or the opening of the gates to
Suleiman's Stables. The Awqaf has held
firmly to its position that it retains the sole
right to undertake renovation and
maintenance of al-Haram al-Sharif, on the
grounds that it enjoys total sovereignty over
the compound, and on the basis of the
operative British Mandate and Jordanian
antiquities laws.22 These laws do not allow
the Jordanian antiquities department to
interfere with the affairs of holy sites. The
relevant religious authorities, in this case the
Islamic Awqaf, retain sole rights.
As a result, Israel kicked up quite a fuss. The
government has enlisted Knesset members,
"antiquities experts" and clerics to support its
opposition to the Awqaf project.23 Some of
these parties went so far as to claim that the
Islamic Awqaf was destroying the remains of
the Second Temple when in September of
1999 it opened three gates leading from the
compound's plazas into the Marwani Mosque.
The charges were made when construction
crews disposed materials that had filled the
stable area over decades, but Awqaf officials
insist that the earth removed was merely dirt
and rubble with little archaeological
significance.
Enter Ariel Sharon. On 28 September, 2000,
the then opposition Likud party leader (now
Israeli prime minister) used Bab al-
Magharibah as his entry point to "visit" the
Haram al-Sharif, igniting a firestorm of
protest. One day later, several worshippers
were killed in the compound's courtyard
when clashes broke out and Israeli troops
fired live ammunition after Friday prayers. In
retaliation, the Awqaf closed the al-Haram al-
Sharif to non-Muslim visitors, expressing that
it alone retained control over the site. Israel
responded by tightening its soldiers' control
over the compound's gates, intensifying the
search of worshippers, and preventing
worshippers under the age of 45 from
entering the Haram, particularly on Fridays.
The most serious of Israel's decisions,
however - and one that remains in effect at
the time of writing - is Israel's prohibition on
renovation materials entering the holy site.
While both sides acknowledge that
renovations are necessary on the southern
wall of the Aqsa Mosque compound, also the
southern wall of Jerusalem's Old City,24 those
repairs have been impeded by Israeli attempts
to establish a precedent. When the Awqaf
attempted to renovate the wall, Israeli
authorities rejected the effort and
subsequently tried to make the repairs
February18.p65 12/04/24, 01:59 ã22
23
themselves on the grounds that the wall posed
a threat to public safety and the preservation
of antiquities. The Islamic Awqaf, for its part,
charged Israel with exaggerating reports on
the site's hazards - reports that said the wall
was near collapse. In the end, the two sides
"agreed" after multilateral intervention, that
the Jordanian government would either
renovate the walls or supervise their
renovation.25
The keys to Bab al-Magharibah have become
"Joha's nail"26 in all dimensions. With these
keys, Israel has imposed a "partnership" on
the Haram al-Sharif, later using that
partnership at the Camp David negotiations
to demand joint sovereignty over the mosque
area, as well as Palestinian recognition of
world Jewry's religious and historical ties to
the site. Should such recognition be granted,
it will undoubtedly lead to subsequent
material claims.
Nazmi al-Jubeh teaches at Birzeit University.
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